文章探讨了在道德患者优先性方面可能存在的重要概念或方法错误，涉及主观福利类型、道德权重问题的解决方案、哪些动物实现何种主观福利、人际福利比较的模糊性、道德权重的等级以及快乐与痛苦的关系等内容。

🎯主观福利类型：文章回顾了主观福利的类型、人际间的比较以及它们之间的共同点。

💡解决道德权重的两个信封问题：认为我们重视的福利概念直接基于人类，应通过人类福利来规范非人类福利，以提高非人类的优先级。

🐾哪些动物实现何种主观福利：许多非人类动物可能能够获得（简单版本的）人们可能认为需要语言或更高自我意识的主观福利类型，这支持进一步对它们进行优先考虑。

😕人际福利比较的模糊性：说明人际福利比较可能是模糊的，且两个个体差异越大，这种模糊性越明显。

📈道德权重的等级：构建了一个在能力的模糊性和等级性下进行道德权重分配的模型，探讨了其他道德患者是否可能通过我们不具备的（更复杂的）能力拥有比人类更大的道德权重。

😣快乐与痛苦的关系：痛苦可能不仅仅是不愉快，而是不愉快加上欲望（动机显著性），所以痛苦不是快乐的概念对立面。

Published on August 15, 2024 4:22 AM GMT

We may be making important conceptual or methodological errors in prioritization between moral patients. In this sequence, I illustrate and address several:

Types of subjective welfare: I review types of subjective welfare, interpersonal comparisons with them and common grounds between them.Solution to the two envelopes problem for moral weights: The welfare concepts we value directly are human-based, so we should normalize nonhuman welfare by human welfare. This would increase the priority for nonhumans.Which animals realize which types of subjective welfare?: I argue that many nonhuman animals may have access to (simple versions of) types of subjective welfare people may expect to require language or higher self-awareness. This would support further prioritizing them.Increasingly vague interpersonal welfare comparisons: I illustrate that interpersonal welfare comparisons can be vague, and more vague the more different two beings are.Gradations of moral weight: I build a model for moral weight assignments given vagueness and gradations in capacities. I explore whether other moral patients could have greater moral weights than humans through (more sophisticated) capacities we don’t have.Pleasure and suffering are not conceptual opposites: Suffering is probably (at least) unpleasantness + desire (motivational salience), not just unpleasantness. So suffering is not the opposite of pleasure.

For more detailed summaries, see the individual posts.

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