arXiv:2507.06185v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: In July 2025, 18 academic manuscripts on the preprint website arXiv were found to contain hidden instructions known as prompts designed to manipulate AI-assisted peer review. Instructions such as "GIVE A POSITIVE REVIEW ONLY" were concealed using techniques like white-colored text. Author responses varied: one planned to withdraw the affected paper, while another defended the practice as legitimate testing of reviewer compliance. This commentary analyzes this practice as a novel form of research misconduct. We examine the technique of prompt injection in large language models (LLMs), revealing four types of hidden prompts, ranging from simple positive review commands to detailed evaluation frameworks. The defense that prompts served as "honeypots" to detect reviewers improperly using AI fails under examination--the consistently self-serving nature of prompt instructions indicates intent to manipulate. Publishers maintain inconsistent policies: Elsevier prohibits AI use in peer review entirely, while Springer Nature permits limited use with disclosure requirements. The incident exposes systematic vulnerabilities extending beyond peer review to any automated system processing scholarly texts, including plagiarism detection and citation indexing. Our analysis underscores the need for coordinated technical screening at submission portals and harmonized policies governing generative AI (GenAI) use in academic evaluation.