本文探讨了自由意志的本质，作者提出一个三难困境：要么自由意志毫无意义，要么存在且我们拥有，要么有意义但我们不拥有。若自由意志无意义，讨论则无意义；若我们拥有自由意志，则应相信它；若有意义但我们不拥有，则改变观点毫无意义。因此，只有在自由意志为真的世界中，我们才能做出选择，所以我们应该相信它，并忽略兼容性、物理本质等相关辩论。作者承认定义的模糊性，但认为论证的自指结构依然成立。文章也感谢了Jakub S.的反馈，并将其观点形式化为最大化持有正确信念的认知义务。

🤔自由意志的概念被定义为一种朴素的、自由主义的观点，即“当我觉得自己做出选择时，我真的有选择”，并带有相关的道德哲学含义，如懒惰是存在的，我应该为我的选择负责。

🧐作者提出了一个三难困境：要么自由意志的概念是无意义的，要么自由意志有意义且我们拥有它，要么自由意志有意义但我们恰好没有它。这三个命题中必有一个成立，不存在其他可能性。

🎯文章的核心论点是，只有当自由意志为真时，我们才能做出相信自由意志的选择。如果自由意志是无意义的，那么讨论毫无意义；如果自由意志存在但我们没有，那么改变我们的观点也是不可能的。因此，我们应该相信自由意志，并忽略其他相关辩论。

Published on January 6, 2025 11:35 PM GMT

I was recently talking with someone about the problem of free will, and I realised that for many years now I have always had the same response, without really ever soliciting broader critical feedback. The notion of free will here refers to a naive, libertarian, non-strictly-defined approach of "when I feel I make choices, I really had a choice", and all of the associated implied moral philosophy (laziness is a thing, I can be blamed for my choices etc.)

The starting assumption is that I want to believe in true things (I leave open the question of whether this epistemic duty is itself justified or not). I propose a trilemma, where exactly one of the following propositions holds:

Either the notion of 'free will' is meaningless, orIt is meaningful, and I do have in fact have free will, orIt is meaningful, but I happen to not have it

If (1) is true, then the whole discussion is moot: nothing can be true or false, and whatever I believe is equally justified.If (2) is true, then I want to believe in having free will (since it is true that I have it).If (3) is true, then "should" is a meaningless concept - there is no way I would be able to change my view one way or the other.

So, the only possible world where I get to make this choice is a world in which free will is true, so I should believe in it - and mostly ignore the debate about compatibilism, the nature of physics, dualism etc. Which is what I do.

One potential issue is that (1) can be true or false depending on the precise definition (but then what even is a precise definition?). Still, I suspect that no matter which one I instantiate it with, as long as it is sensible, the general (self-referential) structure of the argument will stay the same.

Thanks to Jakub S. for the feedback on this post and his suggestion to formalise this argument as the epistemic duty of maximising the probability of holding correct beliefs.

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