印尼科技行业近期接连爆出财务欺诈、挪用资金等丑闻,涉及eFishery、KoinWorks、Investree、Sicepat及Gojek等知名企业,甚至包括国有投资机构MDI Ventures的CEO被捕,引发市场对东南亚创投生态的广泛担忧。其中,TaniHub及其金融科技部门TaniFund的事件尤为引人注目,TaniFund被指利用风投资金填补贷款违约窟窿,最终导致公司清算。这些事件不仅暴露了印尼科技企业在公司治理和财务管理上的深层问题,也对投资者信心造成了严重打击。文章探讨了B2B平台转型为供应链金融的模式风险,并呼吁审计、咨询和法律等服务生态链共同承担责任,反思行业发展中的信任与监管缺失。
💰 **印尼科技生态系统丑闻频发,严重侵蚀投资者信心。** 近期,eFishery、KoinWorks、Investree、Sicepat及Gojek等公司接连爆出财务欺诈、挪用公款等丑闻。尤为严重的是,MDI Ventures(印尼国有电信公司Telkom Indonesia的风险投资部门)的CEO Donald Wihardja,以及TaniHub的前CEO Ivan Arie Sustiawan和前财务副总裁Edison Tobing因涉嫌腐败和洗钱被捕,案件涉及MDI对TaniHub的2500万美元投资。这些事件共同打击了公众对印尼乃至东南亚初创企业和风险投资生态的信任。
🚜 **B2B平台风险凸显,部分已转向供应链金融。** 文章指出,除了金融科技借贷公司,B2B初创企业也存在高风险。例如,Ula几近倒闭,GudangAda回购了投资者股份,这两家公司共筹集了超过2.5亿美元。有印尼本地的B2C杂货创始人透露,行业内的许多公司选择TaniHub是因为其提供了比普通供应商更长的信用期,暗示了TaniHub可能已实质性地转向了供应链金融业务,这增加了其业务的复杂性和风险敞口。
⚖️ **行业乱象与监管反思:创始人、VC及服务链均需承担责任。** 文章认为,印尼科技行业的问题并非仅仅是年轻创始人缺乏经验,而是整个生态系统的集体失误。eFishery创始人曾声称被建议操纵财务数据,这暴露了行业内普遍存在的道德风险。TaniHub事件中高管被捕是首次公开的案例,传递了更强烈的市场信号。同时,文章也质问审计师、咨询师和律师等服务提供商是否尽到了应有的职责,并呼吁效仿中国早期经济开放时期的严谨和揭露真相的精神,加强对公司治理的监督。
💡 **印尼市场潜力巨大,但发展环境更具挑战。** 文章否定了印尼是“坏市场”的论调,认为印尼2.7亿人口蕴含巨大潜力,科技能解决诸多问题。Monee和TikTok Shop在印尼的成功也证明了这一点。然而,与中国相比,印尼缺乏政府主导的基础设施建设和同步发展的多重有利因素(如城市化、支付基础设施等),导致在印尼建立科技公司面临更大的摩擦和挑战。因此,抓住机遇的企业需要比中国同行具有更高的运营效率。
Scandal after scandal has rocked Indonesia’s tech ecosystem: eFishery’s founders were suspended and investigated for financial fraud; fintech lending company KoinWorks was implicated in a fraudulent lending scheme; founder of another fintech lender, Investree, fled the country amid regulator investigations; logistics startup Sicepat’s CEO allegedly diverted company funds for stock speculation; even Gojek’s founder last month faced questioning over corruption linked to a major school procurement project.
Last week, it also emerged that three prominent individuals in the ecosystem were arrested on suspicion of involvement in a ‘corruption and money laundering’ case: Donald Wihardja, CEO of MDI Ventures, the VC arm of state-owned Telkom Indonesia; Ivan Arie Sustiawan, former CEO of TaniHub; and Edison Tobing, former Finance VP of TaniHub. The case concerns a US$25 million investment made by MDI and another state-owned investment firm under Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI) in TaniHub between 2019 and 2023.

TaniHub was founded in 2016 as an “agri-tech” company focused on connecting farmers with restaurants and retailers. After the US$65.5 million Series B round in 2021 led by MDI ventures, TaniHub shifted its focus to B2B operations and aggressively expanded its lending arm, TaniFund.
Then reportedly, TaniFund used venture capital funds to cover looming loan defaults, all the way to the point where even the venture capital funds could not fill it, ultimately triggering a chain of collapses and leading to the company’s forced liquidation by Indonesia’s financial regulator in 2024.

You can find details about the case in local business outlets as well as regional tech media. However, hardly anyone in the ecosystem is surprised, after so many stories involving Indonesia’s tech ecosystem over the last 12 months.
Some thoughts:
While entrusting 10s of millions of dollars to young, inexperienced founders sometimes lead to issues, the widespread misappropriation of funds in the Indonesian ecosystem is still mind boggling. Every case from eFishery to KoinWorks, to Sicepat and now TaniHub, MDI ventures, is seriously denting the confidence in Southeast Asia’s startup and venture capital ecosystem;
The founder of eFishery gave an interview to Bloomberg after the whole thing had blown up, alleging he was advised to manipulate financial results because it was common practice. Many investors in the MW community were stunned by how casually he described this and why he could still be at large. News came in yesterday from Dealstreetasia that he has been detained by the police, alongside a few others implicated in the case;
What makes the TaniHub scandal particularly significant is that it marks the first time high-profile tech executives have been arrested on camera – sending an even stronger signal to the market and global investor community;Alongside fintech lending companies (which naturally touch a lot of money), B2B startups are particularly problematic. Aside from the imploded ones, Ula effectively became defunct and GudangAda recently bought back investor shares – both B2B platforms had collectively raised over US$250 million, with Peak IV (formerly Sequoia India) as an anchor investor;We noticed a long time ago that B2B startups in Indonesia had essentially turned into supply chain financing companies. A B2C grocery founder told us in 2021 that he and his fellow founders in the sector often sourced from TaniHub ONLY because TaniHub offered longer credit terms – “twice as that offered by a normal grocery supplier”;
Commenting on MW’s Chinese post about the TaniHub case, Allen Zhu, the outspoken managing partner at GSR Ventures, put it: “B2B platforms have essentially always been either financing intermediaries or self-operated trading companies. Understanding the basics of business is absolutely crucial.” ie. they should not be treated as scalable tech startups; VCs and startup founders are not the only parties who should do some serious soul searching – the service ecosystem: auditors, consultants and lawyers, did you do your job adequately? Remember when the economy first opened up in China, there was no trust in companies, therefore auditors and short sellers went to great lengths to verify inventory and uncover the truth? So why shouldn’t we be expecting the same level of rigor – or whistleblowing – in this part of the world?A more fundamental question is: is Indonesia simply a bad market for tech – or did we, as an ecosystem, screw it up? We believe it is the latter. Fundamentally Indonesia, with its 270 million population, has a lot of issues that tech can resolve, creating value. Monee, Shopee’s digital financial services affiliate, does exceptionally well in consumer credit in Indonesia; in H1 2025 Indonesia also overtook the U.S. as the largest market for TikTok Shop – to name a few;Building tech in Indonesia, however, can be much harder compared to in China. Tech in China grew rapidly not only because of the increasing middle class, but also the infrastructure created by the government, as well as multiple factors that were growing rapidly at the same time (urbanisation, middle class, payment infrastructure, expressways etc.). In Indonesia, lack of infrastructure and natural tailwind means more friction in building successful tech companies. Subsequently, whoever seizes the opportunity might need to operate at even greater levels of efficiency compared to their Chinese counterparts;Donald Wihardja took over as CEO of MDI in 2020, succeeding Nicko Widjaja, who moved to BRI (another SoE) in an effort to replicate MDI’s initial success. Two years ago, Widjaja famously wrote a LinkedIn post after attending a glamorous VC-tech conference in Bali:
“Some near death startups (with less than 2-3 months run rate) are lining up at the NXC, took selfies and partied with investors, officials, and what have yous. How these guys can still afford to go instead of working their problems at home is beyond my understanding.”
Was he prophetic or just telling the truth (not that there is often a difference between the two)?

The post Our thoughts on the scandals in Indonesia’s VC-startup ecosystem first appeared on The Low Down - Momentum Works.