本文作者针对读者对其“我的同情心很少友善”一文的反馈进行回应，承认在描述自身感受时使用了不恰当的词汇，导致读者误解其缺乏同理心。作者澄清，他确实能够与猫和人类进行“同情”，这种同情包含“悬置不信”，即不将对方视为有道德责任的独立个体，而是将其视为一种工具或助手。他认为，当他将人类视为有道德责任的个体时，这种“同情”并不必然导向更强的同情心或友善。

💡 作者承认在原文中使用了错误的词汇来描述其感受，导致读者误解为他缺乏同理心。他并非不理解同理心，而是用于描述的词汇不准确，这促使他进行更深入的反思。

🐾 作者解释了他所理解的“同情”方式，即能够与猫和人类进行“同情”，这是一种“悬置不信”的过程。他将这种“同情”类比于对待猫，不认为对方是需要承担道德责任的独立个体，而是将其视为工具或助手。

⚖️ 作者进一步阐述，当他将人类视为有道德责任的个体（即“成年人”）时，他所进行的“同情”并不必然使他对对方产生更强的同情心、更友善或更慷慨。他认为，读者将“被同情”和“被视为道德主体”混淆了。

🤔 作者的反思表明，他能够理解并回应读者“被看见”的需求，但有时这种需求是希望被当作有道德责任的个体来对待，而非简单的同情。他认为自己的文章回应了“同情”的层面，而忽略了“道德主体”的层面。

Published on July 31, 2025 5:21 PM GMT

There’s now over 100 comments on “My Empathy Is Rarely Kind”, and the consensus response is roughly “John, that’s not what empathy is”.

So, first things first: I agree. I was using the wrong words for the things I tried to describe, and this was a useful thing to realize, so thank you everyone for that!

As a result of using the wrong words, I think people mostly walked away with the impression that I don’t know how to do the-thing-usually-called-”empathy”. And while I don’t claim to be especially good at empathy, I think the post gave an inaccurate impression, due to using the wrong words.

I do, in fact, empathize with literal cats. I track what the cat is thinking and feeling, and part of that is vicariously feeling some of what the cat feels. I can empathize with humans in the same way I empathize with cats. That form of empathy involves keeping the “suspension of disbelief” in place.

But then… suspension of disbelief in what? If I am in fact empathizing (as the word is typically used), what disbelief have I suspended?

On reflection, I think I suspend disbelief in the subject’s moral agency. (This was a useful thing for me to realize, so again, thank you everyone!)

With cats, this is usually pretty easy. I don’t usually think of cats as the type of creature which it makes sense to hold responsible for anything. If working on a team with a cat, I wouldn’t treat it as another agent, I’d treat it as a tool or assistant. I wouldn’t particularly expect a cat to uphold its side of a contract, except insofar as that's a default outcome. I wouldn’t give a cat voting power. I do want cats to be happy, all else equal, but I don’t think of the cat as having any responsibility for its happiness. Or for anything else.

And that’s the sort of attitude I take toward other humans, when I suspend disbelief in their moral agency (which I do most of the time).

With that in mind, let’s go back to the opening of “My Empathy Is Rarely Kind”:

There’s a narrative I hear a lot: if I empathize more, put myself in other peoples’ shoes, try to feel what they’re feeling, see things from their perspective, etc, then I’ll feel kinder toward them. I’ll feel more sympathetic, be gentler, more compassionate or generous.

And man, that sure is not my experience with empathy.

People say they want to be “seen as a human”. And sometimes they mean that they want to be empathized with. Sometimes they mean they want to be treated as moral agents (i.e. treated as a grown-up, rather than a child or a cat). And I think I wrote an essay responding to the empathy one, when I should have written an essay responding to the moral agent one.

… but also, I think people jumble those things together a lot? Perhaps a more accurate takeaway from “My Empathy Is Rarely Kind” would be: I can empathize with people while suspending judgement, empathize while suspending disbelief in their moral agency, but that does not usually make me more sympathetic toward them when I do view them as a moral agent.

Discuss