arXiv:2507.18229v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The application of Reinforcement Learning (RL) to economic modeling reveals a fundamental conflict between the assumptions of equilibrium theory and the emergent behavior of learning agents. While canonical economic models assume atomistic agents act as takers' of aggregate market conditions, a naive single-agent RL simulation incentivizes the agent to become amanipulator' of its environment. This paper first demonstrates this discrepancy within a search-and-matching model with concave production, showing that a standard RL agent learns a non-equilibrium, monopsonistic policy. Additionally, we identify a parametric bias arising from the mismatch between economic discounting and RL's treatment of intertemporal costs. To address both issues, we propose a calibrated Mean-Field Reinforcement Learning framework that embeds a representative agent in a fixed macroeconomic field and adjusts the cost function to reflect economic opportunity costs. Our iterative algorithm converges to a self-consistent fixed point where the agent's policy aligns with the competitive equilibrium. This approach provides a tractable and theoretically sound methodology for modeling learning agents in economic systems within the broader domain of computational social science.