arXiv:2507.02211v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Recent studies in the spatial prisoner's dilemma games with reinforcement learning have shown that static agents can learn to cooperate through a diverse sort of mechanisms, including noise injection, different types of learning algorithms and neighbours' payoff knowledge.In this work, using an independent multi-agent Q-learning algorithm, we study the effects of dilution and mobility in the spatial version of the prisoner's dilemma. Within this setting, different possible actions for the algorithm are defined, connecting with previous results on the classical, non-reinforcement learning spatial prisoner's dilemma, showcasing the versatility of the algorithm in modeling different game-theoretical scenarios and the benchmarking potential of this approach.As a result, a range of effects is observed, including evidence that games with fixed update rules can be qualitatively equivalent to those with learned ones, as well as the emergence of a symbiotic mutualistic effect between populations that forms when multiple actions are defined.