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Hospitals Are the Target in a New Kind of Cyberwar
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网络安全专家警告称,针对医疗行业的网络攻击动机正在发生转变。越来越多的攻击并非出于经济利益,而是出于政治目的,背后往往有国家支持。这些攻击旨在扰乱医院运营、窃取敏感医疗数据、破坏公众信任。联合国已将针对医疗机构的网络攻击定义为对全球公共卫生和安全的直接和系统性风险。医疗机构需要加强情报共享,建立应对网络攻击的弹性,将网络安全视为患者安全和机构信任的核心组成部分。

🎯 攻击动机转变:传统的勒索软件攻击以经济利益为目的,而现在越来越多的攻击由国家支持,旨在扰乱医院运营、窃取敏感医疗数据、破坏公众信任。

🛡️ 挑战在于溯源:与传统勒索软件团伙的直接经济动机不同,国家支持的行动通常隐藏在复杂的代理、黑客激进分子或松散关联的网络犯罪分子背后,难以追踪溯源。

🤝 情报共享的重要性:关键基础设施组织正在联合起来,形成信息共享和分析中心(ISAC)。Health-ISAC汇集了14000多人,旨在促进网络安全威胁情报的可信交流,从而更快、更协调地应对新兴风险。

🚑 建立网络弹性:医疗机构必须投资于弹性,即在遭受攻击时维持或快速恢复关键服务的能力。这包括制定详细的事件响应计划、实施分段网络架构以及加强备份和恢复系统。

Since the earliest days of cybercrime, healthcare data has been a prime target. Until recently, most cyberattacks on hospitals followed a familiar pattern: ransomware groups would encrypt patient records and demand payment. The motive was clear – and it was all about the money.

But cybersecurity experts are now warning of a shift. A growing number of attacks on health sector systems appear to be driven not by profit, but by politics. These incidents, often traced back to nation state-backed groups, aim to disrupt hospital operations, steal sensitive medical data, and undermine public trust. The United Nations has called cyberattacks on healthcare “a direct and systemic risk to global public health and security.”

This evolution comes at a vulnerable time, as trust in health institutions remains fragile. Cyberattacks deepen that mistrust, strain critical infrastructure, and blur the line between criminal enterprise and geopolitical strategy. As someone working at the intersection of healthcare security and intelligence sharing, I believe this is no longer just a criminal problem – it’s a threat to national security.

The challenge of attribution

As the motives behind cyberattacks on the health sector shift, so too does the complexity of understanding who is behind them – and why.

Unlike the straightforward financial motives of traditional ransomware groups, state-backed campaigns are often hidden behind layers of sophisticated proxies, hacktivist fronts, or loosely affiliated cybercriminals. What may initially appear to be a routine ransomware incident could, upon deeper investigation, reveal signs of a coordinated strategy: targeting critical healthcare infrastructure, maximizing operational disruption, and carefully avoiding attribution to any nation-state.

This pattern has already been seen in high-profile cases. During the COVID-19 pandemic, several European healthcare institutions suffered cyberattacks that officials later suspected were linked to foreign intelligence operations. Although the attacks initially resembled criminal ransomware campaigns, deeper analysis pointed to broader aims – such as stealing vaccine research, disrupting care during a public health emergency, or sowing mistrust in the healthcare system.

This deliberate ambiguity serves the attackers well. By masking strategic sabotage as criminal activity, they sidestep direct political consequences while still inflicting serious harm on institutions providing patient care. For defenders, this blurred line between crime and geopolitics complicates the response at every level: technical, operational, and diplomatic.

In the health sector, patient safety is at immediate risk during a cyber incident, and there is little time or capacity for in-depth forensic analysis. Without a clear understanding of the nature and purpose of an attack, hospitals and healthcare providers may misjudge the threat, miss broader patterns, and fail to coordinate an appropriate defensive strategy.

Importance of intelligence sharing

The key to building an effective defense is collective action, which depends on the free exchange of information. Critical infrastructure organizations are coming together to form Information Sharing and Analysis Centers, or ISACs.  Health-ISAC brings together more than 14,000 people through anon-profit industry association designed to facilitate trusted exchanges of cybersecurity threat intelligence, enabling faster, more coordinated responses to emerging risks. Health-ISAC  connects hospitals, pharmaceutical companies, insurers, and other stakeholders, creating an ecosystem where  knowledge flows more freely and early warnings can be amplified across the global health community.

By sharing indicators of compromise, attack techniques, suspicious behaviors, and lessons learned, organizations can turn isolated observations into industry-wide intelligence. A malware signature spotted in a single hospital today could be the early warning that prevents a wave of attacks across the entire globe tomorrow. In this way, intelligence sharing transforms defense from a series of isolated struggles into a coordinated, proactive effort.

However, building and sustaining this kind of collaboration is not without its challenges. Effective sharing depends on trust: trust that sensitive information will be handled responsibly, and trust that participants are committed to mutual defense. Health sector organizations must be willing to report incidents transparently. Fostering this culture of openness remains one of the sector’s greatest challenges, but also one of its most powerful opportunities to strengthen the industry against increasingly sophisticated threats.

Building resilience

While robust cybersecurity controls remain essential, the reality is that preventing every attack is impossible. Therefore, health sector institutions must invest in resilience: the ability to maintain or quickly restore critical services under attack.

That starts with preparation. Organizations should develop and regularly rehearse detailed incident response plans tailored to their specific workflows, facilities, and patient care requirements. These exercises help staff know what to do when systems go down and ensure that decision-making isn’t delayed by confusion or uncertainty during a crisis.

Segmented network architectures are another critical defense. By isolating systems – such as separating medical devices from administrative tools or confining lab networks to their own segment – organizations can prevent malware from moving laterally and causing widespread disruption. This kind of compartmentalization limits damage and buys valuable time for response teams.

Equally important is the strength and accessibility of backup and recovery systems. Backups should be stored securely, tested regularly, and maintained in offline or immutable formats to prevent them from being manipulatedduring an attack. The faster an organization can restore patient records, scheduling tools, and communication systems, the sooner it can return to safe and effective care.

Final thoughts

Too often, cyberattacks reveal that resilience was treated as an afterthought. But in the health sector – in which lives are on the line – it must be a foundational priority. Planning, practice, and coordination are no longer optional. They are the frontline defenses in a cyberwar hospitals can no longer afford to ignore.

What’s needed now is a shift in mindset. Health sectorleaders must view cybersecurity not as an IT issue, but as a core part of patient safety and institutional trust. That means allocating resources, engaging staff at every level, and collaborating beyond organizational boundaries. 

No single hospital can stand alone against the forces reshaping the threat landscape. But together – through shared intelligence, coordinated response, and a renewed focus on resilience – the health sector can push back against this rising tide and protect the critical systems millions rely on every day.

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网络安全 医疗机构 网络战 情报共享
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