Unite.AI 04月30日 01:12
Kieran Norton, Deloitte’s US Cyber AI & Automation leader – Interview Series
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德勤网络安全专家Kieran Norton指出,随着AI代理自主性增强,网络安全面临数据泄露、代理操控、AI身份管理等新威胁。数据投毒攻击和模型篡改也日益猖獗。传统网络安全框架在应对AI系统风险时存在局限性,组织需进行AI就绪评估,建立AI治理流程,构建可信AI架构,并加强软件开发生命周期管理。AI防火墙作为新型安全层,监控AI系统的输入输出,防止滥用和数据泄露,确保AI行为的负责任性。

🤖 **AI代理自主性风险**: AI代理的自主性可能导致对用户、数据和其他代理之间关系的可见性和控制力下降,增加数据泄露、代理操控和Agent攻击链的风险。

🛡️ **数据投毒与预防**: 数据投毒是指恶意行为者将有害数据注入训练集,影响AI模型的准确性。预防策略包括数据验证、安全增强的联邦学习以及零信任管道等。

🔑 **模型篡改及检测**: 恶意行为者可以通过API劫持、内存空间操纵等方式篡改已部署的AI模型。早期检测方法包括端点遥测监控、安全推理管道和模型水印技术。

🔥 **AI防火墙的作用**: AI防火墙是一种安全层,用于监控和控制AI系统的输入和输出,以防止恶意使用、保护敏感数据并确保AI行为的负责任性。与传统防火墙不同,AI防火墙侧重于理解和管理自然语言交互。

Kieran Norton a principal (partner) at Deloitte & Touche LLP, is the US Cyber AI & Automation Leader for Deloitte. With over 25 years of extensive experience and a solid technology background, Kieran excels in addressing emerging risks, providing clients with strategic and pragmatic insights into cybersecurity and technology risk management.

Within Deloitte, Kieran leads the AI transformation efforts for the US Cyber practice. He oversees the design, development, and market deployment of AI and automation solutions, helping clients enhance their cyber capabilities and adopt AI/Gen AI technologies while effectively managing the associated risks.

Externally, Kieran helps clients in evolving their traditional security strategies to support digital transformation, modernize supply chains, accelerate time to market, reduce costs, and achieve other critical business objectives.

With AI agents becoming increasingly autonomous, what new categories of cybersecurity threats are emerging that businesses may not yet fully understand?

The risks associated with using new AI related technologies to design, build, deploy and manage agents may be understood—operationalized is a different matter.

AI agent agency and autonomy – the ability for agents to perceive, decide, act and operate independent of humans –can create challenges with maintaining visibility and control over relationships and interactions that models/agents have with users, data and other agents.  As agents continue to multiply within the enterprise, connecting multiple platforms and services with increasing autonomy and decision rights, this will become increasingly more difficult. The threats associated with poorly protected, excessive or shadow AI agency/autonomy are numerous. This can include data leakage, agent manipulation (via prompt injection, etc.) and agent-to-agent attack chains.  Not all of these threats are here-and-now, but enterprises should consider how they will manage these threats as they adopt and mature AI driven capabilities.

AI Identity management is another risk that should be thoughtfully considered.  Identifying, establishing and managing the machine identities of AI agents will become more complex as more agents are deployed and used across enterprises. The ephemeral nature of AI models / model components that are spun up and torn down repeatedly under varying circumstances, will result in challenges in maintaining these model IDs.  Model identities are needed to monitor the activity and behavior of agents from both a security and trust perspective. If not implemented and monitored properly, detecting potential issues (performance, security, etc.) will be very challenging.

How concerned should we be about data poisoning attacks in AI training pipelines, and what are the best prevention strategies?

Data poisoning represents one of several ways to influence / manipulate AI models within the model development lifecycle. Poisoning typically occurs when a bad actor injects harmful data into the training set. However, it’s important to note that beyond explicit adversarial actors, data poisoning can occur due to mistakes or systemic issues in data generation.  As organizations become more data hungry and look for useable data in more places (e.g., outsourced manual annotation, purchased or generated synthetic data sets, etc.), the possibility of unintentionally poisoning training data grows, and may not always be easily diagnosed.

Targeting training pipelines is a primary attack vector used by adversaries for both subtle and overt influence. Manipulation of AI models can lead to outcomes that include false positives, false negatives, and other more subtle covert influences that can alter AI predictions.

Prevention strategies range from implementing solutions that are technical, procedural and architectural.  Procedural strategies include data validation / sanitization and trust assessments; technical strategies include using security enhancements with AI techniques like federated learning; architectural strategies include implementing zero-trust pipelines and implementing robust monitoring / alerting that can facilitate anomaly detection. These models are only as good as their data, even if an organization is using the latest and greatest tools, so data poisoning can become an Achilles heel for the unprepared.

In what ways can malicious actors manipulate AI models post-deployment, and how can enterprises detect tampering early?

Access to AI models post-deployment is typically achieved through accessing an Application Programming Interface (API), an application via an embedded system, and/or via a port-protocol to an edge device. Early detection requires early work in the Software Development Lifecycle (SDLC), understanding the relevant model manipulation techniques as well as prioritized threat vectors to devise methods for detection and protection. Some model manipulation involves API hijacking, manipulation of memory spaces (runtime), and slow / gradual poisoning via model drift. Given these methods of manipulation, some early detection strategies may include using end point telemetry / monitoring (via Endpoint Detection and Response and Extended Detection and Response), implementing secure inference pipelines (e.g., confidential computing and Zero Trust principles), and enabling model watermarking / model signing.

Prompt injection is a family of model attacks that occur post-deployment and can be used for various purposes, including extracting data in unintended ways, revealing system prompts not meant for normal users, and inducing model responses that may cast an organization in a negative light. There are variety of guardrail tools in the market to help mitigate the risk of prompt injection, but as with the rest of cyber, this is an arms race where attack techniques and defensive counter measures are constantly being updated.

How do traditional cybersecurity frameworks fall short in addressing the unique risks of AI systems?

We typically associate ‘cybersecurity framework’ with guidance and standards – e.g. NIST, ISO, MITRE, etc. Some of the organizations behind these have published updated guidance specific to protecting AI systems which can be very helpful.

AI does not render these frameworks ineffective – you still need to address all the traditional domains of cybersecurity — what you may need is to update your processes and programs (e.g. your SDLC) to address the nuances associated with AI workloads.  Embedding and automating (where possible) controls to protect against the nuanced threats described above is the most efficient and effective way forward.

At a tactical level, it is worth mentioning that the full range of possible inputs and outputs is often vastly larger than non-AI applications, which creates a problem of scale for traditional penetration testing and rules-based detections, hence the focus on automation.

What key elements should be included in a cybersecurity strategy specifically designed for organizations deploying generative AI or large language models?

When developing a cybersecurity strategy for deploying GenAI or large language models (LLMs), there is no one-size-fits-all approach. Much depends on the organization’s overall business objectives, IT strategy, industry focus, regulatory footprint, risk tolerance, etc. as well as the specific AI use cases under consideration.   An internal use only chatbot carries a very different risk profile than an agent that could impact health outcomes for patients for example.

That said, there are fundamentals that every organization should address:

Can you explain the concept of an “AI firewall” in simple terms? How does it differ from traditional network firewalls?

An AI firewall is a security layer designed to monitor and control the inputs and outputs of AI systems—especially large language models—to prevent misuse, protect sensitive data, and ensure responsible AI behavior. Unlike traditional firewalls that protect networks by filtering traffic based on IP addresses, ports, and known threats, AI firewalls focus on understanding and managing natural language interactions. They block things like toxic content, data leakage, prompt injection, and unethical use of AI by applying policies, context-aware filters, and model-specific guardrails. In essence, while a traditional firewall protects your network, an AI firewall protects your AI models and their outputs.

Are there any current industry standards or emerging protocols that govern the use of AI-specific firewalls or guardrails?
Model communication protocol (MCP) is not a universal standard but is gaining traction across the industry to help address the growing configuration burden on enterprises that have a need to manage AI-GenAI solution diversity. MCP governs how AI models exchange information (including learning) inclusive of integrity and verification. We can think of MCP as the transmission control protocol (TCP)/internet protocol (IP) stack for AI models which is particularly useful in both centralized, federated, or distributed use cases. MCP is presently a conceptual framework that is realized through various tools, research, and projects.

The space is moving quickly and we can expect it will shift quite a bit over the next few years.

How is AI transforming the field of threat detection and response today compared to just five years ago?

We have seen the commercial security operations center (SOC) platforms modernizing to different degrees, using massive high-quality data sets along with advanced AI/ML models to improve detection and classification of threats. Additionally, they are leveraging automation, workflow and auto-remediation capabilities to reduce the time from detection to mitigation.  Lastly, some have introduced copilot capabilities to further support triage and response.

Additionally, agents are being developed to fulfill select roles within the SOC.  As a practical example, we have built a ‘Digital Analyst’ agent for deployment in our own managed services offering.   The agent serves as a level one analyst, triaging inbound alerts, adding context from threat intel and other sources, and recommending response steps (based on extensive case history) for our human analysts who then review, modify if needed and take action.

How do you see the relationship between AI and cybersecurity evolving over the next 3–5 years—will AI be more of a risk or a solution?
As AI evolves over the next 3-5 years, it can help cybersecurity but at the same time, it can also introduce risks. AI will expand the attack surface and create new challenges from a defensive perspective.  Additionally, adversarial AI is going to increase the viability, speed and scale of attacks which will create further challenges. On the flip side, leveraging AI in the business of cybersecurity presents significant opportunities to improve effectiveness, efficiency, agility and speed of cyber operations across most domains—ultimately creating a ‘fight fire with fire’ scenario.

Thank you for the great interview, readers may also wish to visit Deloitte.

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