本文基于三个有争议但并非荒谬的假设，即多元宇宙的存在、意识的可模拟性和身份的传承，论证了主观死亡的不可能。作者认为，在多元宇宙中，必然存在着模拟你被复活并恢复意识的“复活模拟”，而这些模拟由于具有意识和与你相同的记忆，因此本质上就是你，因此你永远无法体验到“死亡”。

🤔 **多元宇宙的存在：** 作者假设我们生活在一个多元宇宙中，这意味着存在着无数个平行宇宙。在这些平行宇宙中，必然存在着“复活模拟”，即模拟你被复活并恢复意识的宇宙。

🧠 **意识的可模拟性：** 作者认为意识可以被计算机模拟，这意味着这些“复活模拟”将是具有意识的，并拥有主观体验。

🧬 **身份的传承：** 作者认为身份可以通过观察者时刻的相似性来传承。这意味着“复活模拟”由于拥有与你相同的记忆，因此本质上就是你。

因此，作者得出结论，由于存在“复活模拟”，你永远无法体验到“死亡”。

💡 虽然这个结论听起来很疯狂，但如果接受这些假设，那么这个结论就变得相对直观。

然而，本文并未探讨这些假设本身的真伪。

Published on July 4, 2024 6:17 PM GMT

Epistemic Status: ~70% credence, hoping to get some feedback.

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I'm going to argue that if we accept three controversial (but not outlandish) assumptions to be true, then subjective death (the cessation of conscious experiences identifying themselves as "you") is impossible. I'm going to keep this post as concise and straight-forward as I can.

 

Here are the three assumptions:

We live in a multiverse (e.g. the MWI or Tegmark MUH is true).Consciousness can be simulated computationally.Identity is "transmitted" through similarity of observer-moments.

 

Given assumption 1, somewhere "out there" (e.g in a different Everett branch), there will be worlds that contain "revival simulations" of you (simulations of you being revived and regaining consciousness after your death).

Given assumption 2, these simulations will be conscious and have subjective experience.

Given assumption 3, these "revival simulations" of you are technically "you" since your identity is transmitted through a continuity of similar observer-moments and they possess the same memory as you before you died.

Therefore, similar to the argument for quantum immortality, you can never experience "death" and should always expect to be revived.

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These conclusions sound pretty crazy to me intuitively, but if one accepts the assumptions (whether or not those assumptions are true is outside the scope of this post), these conclusions feel relatively straight-forward.

Discuss